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SESSION FIVE- LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
The liability of officers and directors is of obvious concern to present and
potential officers and directors. The public too is interested in this subject
because the liability of officers and directors impacts on the desirability of
holding positions of responsibility in the corporation and on the behavior of
persons holding such positions. Ideally, liability law should be sufficiently
strict to punish wrongdoing, yet not so harsh that it discourages qualified-
persons from accepting positions as officers or directors or frightens them into
inaction.
While officer and director liability law encompasses liability for both
mismanagement and fraud, the presentations and roundtable discussion focused
on liability for mismanagement in the merger, acquisition and bankruptcy
contexts. Professor Barthl~my Mercadal, a member of the International
Faculty and moderator of this session of the Colloquium, led off with an
introduction to French liability law. Much attention was devoted to France's
unique Article 99 which presumes mismanagement in bankruptcy cases. Pro-
fessor Mercadal rounded out his presentation by briefly commenting on officer
and director liability in other contexts.
Professor Mercadal's introduction was followed by presentations by other
members of the International Faculty: Professor Noyes Leech of the United
States; Professor Alain Hirsch of Switzerland; and Professor Modesto
Carvalhosa of Brazil. Mr. Henri Berthon and Mr. Frangois Denisot then
elaborated upon the French experience.
Professor Noyes Leech began his review of the U.S. law by briefly tracking
the historical basis of the term "fiduciary duty". The concepts of "duty of
loyalty" and "duty of care", which grew out of "fiduciary duty", were then
examined, primarily by way of example. The duty of care discussion included
an overview of the federal securities laws as they relate to officer and director
liability. Professor Leech concluded by introducing the U.S. approach to
liability in bankruptcy cases.
Professor Alain Hirsch explained that in Switzerland, questions of liability
are adjudicated most commonly in the context of bankruptcy suits. As in
France, the creditors usually claim that the company was operated longer than
was prudent. Unlike France, Germany, and the United States, however,
usually, the auditors are sued, not the officers and directors of the bankrupt
corporation. The reason for this difference was explained and a recent example
was given.
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Professor Modesto Carvalhosa commented that in Brazil officers and direc-
tors are subject to civil liability as well as criminal sanctions and administrative
penalties. Shareholders can sue in their individual capacities or on behalf of the
corporation. Directors cannot be held liable in bankruptcy cases, however,
unless there has been fraud. Professor Carvalhosa concluded by examining the
effect of government ownership of a corporation on liability in the bankruptcy
context.
Mr. Henri Berthon briefly reviewed Article 99's salient features. He ob-
served that the scope of management personnel covered by the Article is
undefined and often depends upon the facts of the particular case. Mr.
Berthon presented the arguments made by commentators in favor of and
against Article 99.
Mr. Franqois Denisot discussed the liability of officers and directors under
French law in the mergers and acquisition context. He examined the trend in
the regulations from officer and director freedom to greater and greater
administrative control. Tender offer regulation now involves the participation
of several regulatory bodies. Merger regulations carefully monitor fairness in
the pricing and valuation of the assets that each company contributes to the
deal. Mr. Denisot concluded by summarizing the improvements which have
been generated by the new regulations.
The roundtable discussion following these presentations focused on France's
Article 99. Professor Mundheim's inquiry concerning the application of Article
99 to a hypothetical Chrysler-France led to an interesting comparison which
reminded participants that at times corporate laws generate social and political
effects which cannot be ignored. Article 99 was thoroughly reviewed; its
strengths and weaknesses were exposed.
Professor Mercadal:
In France director liability is based primarily on the concept of mismanage-
ment. Directors and officers who have been imprudent will be held liable for
resulting losses. Common forms of mismanagement include negligence and
business judgment error. Negligence is likely to be found in cases in which
directors habitually fail to attend board meetings or fail adequately to super-
vise management. Business judgment errors can take many forms, one of which
is committing a coipany to pay more than it can afford. This sometimes
occurs in the heat of deal-making. At other times, an officer or director may
overcommit funds to benefit another company in which he has an interest.
Another form of business judgment error is abuse of discretion in permit-
ting a takeover of corporate control. This phenomenon has confronted the
French courts over the last ten years, often making headlines. Well-informed
Frenchmen are aware of the Saupiquet Cassegrain case, whose last episode took
place in June 1983 before the Cour de Cassation. The approval of the
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Saupiquet Cassegrain Board was required before control of the company could
be acquired. The board majority that approved the takeover was also in voting
control of the company through stock ownership. The question arose whether
the board's approval was in the best interests of the company as a whole,
including the minority shareholders. If not, the board's approval was an abuse
of discretion. The Cour de Cassation's decision that the board did not abuse its
discretion has left unanswered many questions in this area. The fiduciary duty
that board members in the United States have toward minority shareholders
will provide a useful comparison. The views of our foreign friends, particularly
our American colleagues, will be helpful here.
I now turn to the liability of directors and officers in France who are found
to have led their company to a cessation of payments [1]. Our famous Article
99 [2] holds board members prima facie liable for all or part of the company's
excess of liabilities over assets. This applies to cases in which the corporation
has stopped its payments, whether it is eventually bailed out, reorganized or
liquidated. Officers and directors who are sued under Article 99 by the
bankruptcy trustee may be held liable either individually or jointly and
severally. The court has complete discretion over the allocation of the liability.
Article 99 is a very strong deterrent: a director who has been held liable and
does not meet his obligations is automaticallly declared personally bankrupt.
Many Frenchmen consider Article 99 to be not only formidable, but
excessive. The preface to a recent report published by the Chamber of
Commerce of Paris stated that some directors believe that Article 99 is
economically counterproductive. These directors argue that Article 99 provides
the bankruptcy trustee with such potent weapons against officers and directors
that it may deter would-be officers and directors from assuming positions of
responsibility and/or from making business decisions with otherwise accepta-
ble levels of risk. Although statistics indicate that Article 99 has only been
applied in 5-7% of bankruptcy cases, it should be noted that creditors stand
no chance of recovering anything in approximately 80% of bankruptcy cases.
Therefore, after adjusting for these latter cases, it is apparent that Article 99 is
applied in a significant proportion of bankruptcy cases in which there are
defendants with sufficiently deep pockets to repay creditors.
Directors have been held liable under Article 99 in the following cases:
when they have demonstrated extreme negligence in habitually not attending
board meetings or in failing to assure that written minutes of board meetings
were kept; and when they have realized that the CEO-chairman of the board's
mismanagement was leading the company to bankruptcy but in response
merely resigned their directorships. With respect to this second class of cases,
courts often have stated that directors have an affirmative obligation to remove
the chairman from office. Directors are not permitted to absolve themselves
from liablity in such situations by attempting to wash their hands through
resignation.
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Article 99's presumption of directors liability has been successfully rebutted
in cases in which the directors have demonstrated that they exercised due care.
Due care has been established in cases in which directors had developed layoff
plans that were not implemented because of reasons beyond their control. Two
such reasons recognized to date are strikes in which the workers takeover the
plant, and pressure from public authorities not to make layoffs. Pressure
exerted by public authorities, an increasingly common phenomenon in the last
five to six years, has been taken into account in several cases. However, to the
best of my knowledge, this reason has ben recognized only by lower courts.
A lower court recently accepted the argument that directors should not be
held liable for losses that result from business decisions which were sound
when made, based on then available information, but which proved to be
economically unprofitable. This decision announces a new direction that courts
may follow.
This concludes my brief overview of the French experience. I would like to
invite our friends from the International Faculty to give us an overview of their
countries' experiences in the area of officer and director liability.
Professor Leech:
The law applicable to corporations and to corporate managers in the United
States has two levels. The basic law is the law of the individual states. This law
governs the formation of corporations, the fundamental rights and duties of
shareholders and directors, the issuance of shares, the distribution of di-
vidends, and such major changes as amendments to the articles, mergers,
consolidations, and dissolutions. Overlaying these basic state laws are federal
laws enacted by the U.S. Congress in the 1930s, in particular the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [3].
Let us look first to the law of the states. Each state has a basic statute
governing business corporations, but much of the law is judge-made, either
common law (i.e. without a specific statutory base) or developed by the courts
in their interpretation of very general statutory provisions. The liabilities of
directors and officers under state law fall principally under several headings:
the doctrine of ultra vires [4], specific statutory liabilities, and the duties of
loyalty and care.
The doctrine of ultra vires has fallen somewhat into desuetude. Under this
doctrine, a corporation, and its directors and officers, may not act outside the
purposes and powers of the corporation. For example, a corporation is
prohibited from guaranteeing a loan to an individual if no corporate purpose is
served by such a guarantee. As another example, the doctrine precludes a
corporation organized for the purpose of making airplanes from going into the
business of selling groceries. The judge-made law that was built on this
doctrine is somewhat out of date. The doctrine is rarely applied today largely
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol6/iss3/6
Session Five: Ltabihiv of officers and directors
because corporations are now organized under articles of incorporation that
provide for very broad purposes; thus a corporation is empowered to engage in
almost any business activity sanctioned by the board. Nevertheless, an unrea-
sonable use of corporate powers may still subject members of the board to
liability for "corporate waste", such as making excessive charitable gifts [5].
Under state corporation law, directors may be found liable for specific
statutory infractions. For example, state laws invariably define the fund from
which dividends may lawfully be paid to shareholders, for example "surplus"
or "earned surplus". Directors who authorize dividend payments at a time
when the corporation does not have such a fund may be sued to reimburse the
corporation for amounts unlawfully paid [6].
The major bases for the liabilities of officers and directors under state law
are the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty is frequently
referred to as a "fiduciary duty". Perhaps I should begin by briefly describing
the historical basis on which the term "fiduciary duty" rests.
The English courts developed the concept of the trust and the trustee, for
which, I understand, there is no parallel concept in civil law. A trust is a
vehicle through which a person can transfer his property to another in an
indirect way. Either during his lifetime or by will, a person can transfer his
property to a third person, a trustee, to hold (or to operate if the property is a
business) and to give the profits of this property to the intended recipient, the
beneficiary. Ownership is thus divided between the trustee and the beneficiary
[7].
The trust was an invention of the English Courts of Chancery, which
applied the liberal and flexible rules of equity, rather than the strict rules
applied in the law courts. The principal attribute of a rule of fiduciary duty,
which can be distinguished from a rule of contract or tort law, is that a duty
may be owed to the beneficiary even though there is no actual harm to the
beneficiary. Rules are applied because there is a potential for harm.
When the corporation was created an analogy arose between the directors
and officers of the corporation and their shareholders, on the one hand, and
the trustee and the beneficiary on the other. Thus, actions to enforce the
obligations that the shareholders thought the directors and officers owed them
were brought in equity under rules similar to the rules that were applied in
trust cases, namely the law of fiduciary duty.
The extension of the fiduciary duty to corporate directors results in the
following: if a director or an officer is ordered to sell a piece of corporate
property for one million dollars but sells it for one million twenty-five
thousand dollars, he cannot keep the twenty-five thousand dollars for himself.
He is required to account to the corporation for that twenty-five thousand
dollars even though the corporation received the price it desired. It is believed
that allowing the officer or director to keep the excess, or to accept bribes,
might, in some other case, induce him to take action that would be harmful to
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the corporation. Irving Trust Company v. Deutsch [8], a famous case that arose
roughly fifty years ago, when the radio industry was still young, provides
another example. In this case, a corporation in the radio business was inter-
ested in acquiring the stock of a company that held basic patents in that
business. Directors of the corporation came to the conclusion that the corpora-
tion could not afford to buy the stock (with the underlying patents) and
instead of having the corporation buy the stock bought it for themselves. They
subsequently made large profits by selling the stock on the exchange. The court
held that the directors were obliged to account for these profits to the
corporation's trustee in bankruptcy, supporting the theory of the suit that "a
fiduciary may make no profit for himself out of a violation of duty to his cestui
[beneficiary], even though he risk his own funds in the venture" [9].
In a more extreme case [101, now of about thirty years' vintage, a controlling
shareholder, who was also the company president and a director, was required
to account for the premium he realized by selling his stock at a price that was
in excess of its current market value. The court reasoned that by selling control
of the corporation this shareholder had sold a corporate opportunity and, as a
fiduciary, should not be permitted to retain his profit from the transaction. The
plaintiff was not required to show a precise dollar value of damage to the
corporation.
Lastly, in a more recent case [11] in the New York courts, corporate insiders
(the chairman of the board of directors and the president) who engaged in
insider trading in the corporation's shares were required to account to the
corporation for their profits on those shares. While there had been cases in
which persons engaging in insider trading had been required to account to the
other party to the transaction, this case is noteworthy because here the
corporation itself recovered the insiders' profits, even though it was unable to
establish a fixed dollar loss to the corporation.
These examples demonstrate the significance of the evolution of fiduciary
duty. In cases in which fairness is the benchmark, by allowing plaintiffs to
recover without establishing a fixed dollar loss, courts have refused to allow
fiduciaries to benefit from their relationships of special trust.
Duty of care cases involved alleged mismanagement of the corporation.
Mismanagement can take many forms, one of which is the failure to supervise
employees. For example, if a bank cashier embezzles funds, the directors may
be held liable for having failed to review his qualifications adequately at the
time he was employed or for failing to establish procedures designed to reduce
the incidence of embezzlement. Liability based on the duty of care can be
defeated if the director of officer can show that his actions were based on
business judgment. The business judgement defense is most often used to
excuse decisions which appeared profitable at the time they were made but
which later proved to be unprofitable. The business judgment rule, however, is
not an automatic foreclosure of liability. The defense is not established by
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mere assertion that the matter in question involved a business decision. In
order to substantiate the business judgment defense the defendant must show
that a judgment was in fact made, based upon an adequate investigation of the
facts and a thoughtful application of corporate procedure. Nevertheless, I
think it can fairly be said that the duty of care cases that have gone to
judgment against directors and officers and have been affirmed at the appellate
court level are relatively small in number.
The liabilities that I have been describing for violation of the duty of care
and violation of the duty of loyalty are liabilities owed to the corporation. It is
said that the director owes a duty to the corporation. Thi's is important because
it gives rise to what I will refer to as a derivative suit, a suit brought by the
corporation's shareholders on behalf of the corporation.
Beyond these violations of state law, there are also significant offenses
under the federal securities laws. Resulting liabilities are owed in some cases to
individual shareholders, in others to the corporation. The 1933 Act creates
director liabilities for issuing false prospectuses and registration statements.
These liabilities cover negligent omissions of material facts, as well as inten-
tional falsehood. Directors can avoid liability by showing that they exercised
due diligence; the burden is on the director to show that he was not negligent.
The 1934 Act creates liabilities for making false or misleading proxy
statements. As is true of false prospectus liability, this liability can be imposed
for falsehoods or omissions occasioned by negligence. There are special liabili-
ties imposed on insiders under the 1934 Act for dealings in a corporation's
shares that result in what are commonly referred to as "short swing profits"
[12]. Corporations have a cause of action against insiders who profit by buying
or selling shares within a period of six months. Those profits are recoverable
whether or not the insider actually used inside information. If the corporation
does not sue, a shareholder can sue on behalf of the corporation.
Liability can also be imposed for fraud under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
[13] and a rule of the Securities and Exchange Commission under that section,
rule 10b-5 [14]. Fraud is broadly defined; the definition includes false repre-
sentations as well as omissions of material facts in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security. Section 10(b) and its accompanying rule have
given rise to a great flood of litigation in the federal courts. Suits have been
maintained not only by the corporation and shareholders, but also by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
These liabilities of directors and officers that I have described, arising under
both state and federal law, have a significant effect on managerial behavior.
We have a great deal of litigation in the United States. In the corporate field,
individual shareholders may maintain suits in their own right when they have
been directly defrauded. Possibly even more important is the ability of a
shareholder to maintain a derivative suit to enforce a corporate claim. These
derivative suits are numerous largely because lawyers have found them to be
263
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very profitable. In a derivative suit, lawyers are compensated out of the fund
that is developed in the suit. Furthermore, a series of claims by individual
shareholders can be consolidated by one shareholder into a "class action" [151,
in which the lawyers will be compensated out of the fund that is developed.
Many of these suits do not go to judgment. Instead, they are settled by the
parties. As a result, the volume of reported litigation represents only the tip of
the iceberg. The fear of liability is very great indeed; it constantly haunts
corporate directors and officers. Nor is this fear confined to cases involving
bankruptcy. Liability can be imposed even in the case of the solvent corpora-
tion. It is true that liability insurance is available, although at very high
premiums, and that some statutes [16] do provide for indemnification of
directors in some cases - but the fact of the matter is that no one wants to be
sued. It is of little comfort that someone else may help to pay the damages.
This great potential loss exposure explains why American law has been moving
toward preventive medicine rather than curative medicine by litigation. Preven-
tive medicine primarily involves monitoring the management of the corpora-
tion to ensure that injuries do not occur to the corporation or to shareholders.
The effect of bankruptcy of a corporation in the United States is not to
change the nature of the liabilities of directors and officers; it usually only
changes the potential plaintiff in a suit to enforce those liabilities. When a
corporation files for bankruptcy in the United States, a trustee in bankruptcy
is appointed. This trustee may supervise the dissolution and liquidation of the
corporation or he may supervise its reorganization. Reorganizations usually
result in shareholders losing their rights, the interests in the corporation being
divided among the former creditors. One of the duties of the trustee in
bankruptcy is to pursue the causes of action which the corporation had before
bankruptcy, including such corporate causes of action against officers and
directors as I have described.
Professor Mercadal, this concludes my review of the American scene.
Professor Hirsch:
Liability suits outside the bankruptcy context are very rare in Switzerland.
There are two reasons for this: the unavailability of information to share-
holders relating to potential liability, and the lack of incentive for potential
claimants to assert their claims. Bankruptcy suits, however, are very common.
Information concerning bankruptcy is accessible and the need to initiate
proceedings is obvious. As in France, creditors usually claim that those in
control continued to operate the company longer than was prudent. The
creditors argue that the losses would have been less had bankruptcy been
declared earlier. German law is similar to French and Swiss law in this respect
but such suits are less frequent in Germany.
Swiss bankruptcy law is somewhat unique in that, unlike France, Germany,
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and the United States, suits are usually brought against the auditors rather
than those in control of the companies. Auditors, as corporate entities, are
better targets because they are usually solvent.
The primary problem in the determination of liability is ascertaining the
point at which the company should have declared bankruptcy, thereby making
the excessive debt of the company known to the public. Only rarely will a
company continue to do business once its debt has been openly revealed. In
many cases, the company's excessive debt is hidden due to the overvaluation of
certain assets and/or the failure to account for some risks. A precedent-setting
example, which created a well-known scandal, was a case judged by the
Federal Tribunal three years ago involving a real estate company. This Swiss
company, which also operated in Germany through its subsidiaries, had
misjudged its investments in that country, and failed to prepare a consolidated
balance sheet reflecting the investments of its subsidiaries. Although Swiss law
does not generally require a consolidated balance sheet, the court held that
such a balance sheet was indispensable in this case because this was the only
way that the combined risks could have been measured. According to the
court, it was the directors' responsibility to insure that such an assessment be
made and the responsibility of the auditors to demand that it be made. The
auditors were fined one million Swiss francs on this questionable basis alone.
Since this case, it has become routine for the court to determine at the trustee's
request: first, whether bankruptcy was declared later than it should have been;
second, whether losses were incurred during that period; and third, whether
there is someone within or without (auditors) the company with sufficiently
deep pockets to justify bringing suit.
Professor Carvalhosa:
The law of Brazil governing the responsibility of directors is a combination
of longstanding statutory provisions, such as the Bankruptcy Act of 1945 [171,
and modern law. Over time, there has been an increase in the liability exposure
of directors vis-h-vis shareholders and creditors. The personal property of
directors is usually not sufficient to cover the company's debts; civil liability is
not alone an effective sanction against infractions of the civil law and abuses of
power. Thus, Brazilian corporate law establishes three penalties applicable to
directors and officers for damages caused to the corporation, its shareholders,
or the securities market. First, there is the civil liability suit, provided for in
section 159 of Corporate Law No. 6.404/76, which is aimed at indemnifying
the company for damages caused by misconduct of its officers of directors.
Second, criminal sanctions consisting of imprisonment or fine, may be imposed
where abusive or fraudulent acts have been practiced in connection with the
incorporation or management of a company. According to section 177 of the
Penal Code, acts such as fictitious distribution of dividends, false or misleading
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information on the company's financial statements are considered to be
fraudulent for that purpose. Finally, there are administrative penalties which
may be imposed on members of management by the Securities Commission as
a result of administrative proceedings. Such penalties include fines, temporary
suspension from office, and declaration of inability to hold office as a
corporate director or officer. They apply to cases of unfair market practices
such as manipulation of securities prices, fraudulent acts in connection with
the primary or secondary distribution of securities, regardless of possible
criminal implications or of the existence of actual harm to the corporation, its
shareholders or third parties.
In listed corporations and in state-controlled corporations [18] that are
structured with a board of directors and officers [19], the liability of members
of the board of directors is joint but not several. This rule applies whether civil
liability or administrative penalties are imposed. However, as far as officers are
concerned, liability is usually several; it is only joint in cases involving
collusion or collective decision-making.
In the context of management liability, a distinction may be drawn between
abuses of power and other violations of the law. Abuse of power occurs when
management acts in breach of its fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
shareholders. In such cases the company, directly or derivatively, has an action
against the director or officer to recover the damages it suffered. Actual harm
must be evidenced and the alleged damage must be capable of being quanti-
fied. On the other hand, violations of the law or the by-laws of the corporation
have an objective nature, that is to say, they imply direct liability, regardless of
evidence of the harm done. For instance, if a director or officer fails to give
notice of a shareholders' meeting in the manner and time provided for in the
law, or if a meeting is held without a proper quorum, such acts may be
judicially invalidated and management be held liable to the corporation.
Directors and officers cannot be held liable in bankruptcy cases unless
fraud has been established. Examples of fraud include excessive spending,
insider trading, and delaying the declaration of bankruptcy by procuring funds
in an irresponsible or fraudulent manner. In such cases the directors and
officers will be liable for the amount lost. A state-controlled company cannot
be declared bankrupt. In such cases, the liability of the controlling shareholder,
the state, may be invoked. The state will be secondarily liable for commitments
made by the managers. That the state should be ultimately liable for obliga-
tions incurred by management is rational and equitable, given the legal
guarantee that companies would be immune from bankruptcy. However,
directors and officers of said corporations are subject to the same liability rules
as those of corporations not controlled by the state.
In Brazil there is no record of suits against the state for liability to pay debts
of the corporations it controls. This is so because in emergency cases the
government always supplies the companies it controls with necessary funds so
that its credibility is maintained and court action avoided.
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Mr. Berthon:
Officers and directors of French corporations are routinely subject to
potential liability because of the large number of important decisions that they
must make. They can incur criminal liability for violating civil code provisions
or specific statutes concerning such areas as corporate law, labor law, social
security law, tax law, and antitrust law. Civil liability, although wideranging in
principle, usually is applied in cases of bankruptcy. In nonbankruptcy cases,
the majority shareholders prefer simply to dismiss the management rather than
to bring actions that are likely to impair the company's image.
Liability actions are brought under Article 99 [20] of the July 13, 1967,
statute when bankruptcy procedures indicate that the corporation's assets are
insufficient to meet its liabilities. Article 99 creates a dual presumption: it
presumes that the officers and directors mismanaged the corporation, and that
this mismanagement caused the excess of liabilities over assets. This law
permits a court to hold some or all officers and directors liable for some or all
of the corporation's debts, unless these persons can prove that they exercised
due diligence in conducting the corporation's affairs. Such actions can be
initiated by the trustee in bankruptcy or the court.
Article 99 does not specify which members of management it covers. Its
presumption of liability has been applied to directors, the sole CEO (whether
chairman of the board or not), the members of the supervisory board, if any
and, sometimes other chief officers [21]. Whether chief officers other than the
CEO-chairman can be reached by Article 99 will depend upon the facts of the
particular situation. The resolution of this question is especially difficult in
cases in which there are several CEOs, one of whom is the chairman of the
board. Article 99 also covers outside persons or companies such as banks or
parent companies that are substantially involved in the management of the
company. The rationale here is that participation in the de facto management
of a company properly subjects these entities to liability provisions aimed at
protecting creditors from mismanagement. The deeper a potential defendant's
pocket, the greater the likelihood that an Article 99 suit will be brought against
him.
Those sued under Article 99 can successfully defend themselves by estab-
lishing that they exercised due diligence [22]. Although the directors are not
required to prove affirmatively that they were not at fault, the burden of proof
they must meet is heavy. Courts rarely find that due diligence has been proved.
Interestingly, court decisions very often do not squarely rely on Article 99's
fault presumption. Many opinions review in great detail the defendants' poor
management, as if the action was based on ordinary liability law principles,
and only subsequently dismiss the defendants' attemps to refute Article 99's
presumption [23].
Article 99 is most important when there is some question whether mis-
management has occurred. In cases in which the directors may not have been
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sufficiently at fault to impose liability, Article 99 is used to publicly sanction
them. This practice reflects a policy decision that sanctioning some innocent
officers and directors is preferable to allowing any fault to go unpunished.
The opinions of respected commentators concerning Article 99 vary. The
proponents of Article 99 argue that the important consequences of manage-
ment actions, which may be felt by shareholders and/or employees, suggest
that society should encourage officers and directors to be cautious and
prudent. Shareholders entrust funds while employees, in a sense, entrust their
jobs to the management team. These commentators claim that Article 99 has
improved creditor debt collection, and that it has served to deter careless
management [24], largely because actions can be brought under Article 99 that
could not have been brought otherwise. Indeed, creditors, and sometimes even
the trustee in bankruptcy, often lack knowledge of the facts which would
enable them to prove director mismanagement under the rules of tort law.
These commentators are quick to point out that the courts have been very
reasonable in applying the potent provisions of Article 99.
The opponents of Article 99 focus their criticism on the presumption of
management fault which, contrary to fundamental principles of French law,
imposes the burden of proof on the defendant. These commentators believe
that the legal system should encourage officers and directors to be bold and
daring: an economy that is not moving forward is, in fact, moving backward.
Rather than encouraging such behavior, it is argued that Article 99 in fact
operates to restrict managers by causing them to: refrain from pursuing their
natural inclinations; remain deaf to the needs of employees or to the social or
economic needs of a region; walk away from a company which stood a good
chance of recovering (leaving the government to do as it wishes). An economy
plagued by these forms of mismanagement is likely to fare poorly in the long
run, relative to international competition.
The Article 99 presumption does not affect the behavior of all officers and
directors. Those with no assets have little reason to fear Article 99. Article 99's
effect on de facto directors, however, is far too great. Banks and salvage
corporations are particularly fearful of being deemed de facto directors.
It is also claimed that the courts have been too severe in applying Article 99,
and that judges (although often officers or directors themselves) may not be as
moderate or as well qualified to judge the actions of directors as the propo-
nents claim [25]. The following case [26] may be cited as an example. This case
involved a corporation located in an industrially undeveloped area of France.
The directors employed what are normally considered classic methods to
fundamentally reorganize the company. They hired a new management team,
consolidated the company's liabilities, obtained long-term extensions on loans,
and significantly increased the company's capital by issuing new shares.
Although financial stabilization was achieved, the company proved to be
unprofitable in a short time, primarily because of a sharp and unforeseen
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decline in the selling price of the company's product. Notwithstanding the
unpredictability of such a price decline, the court decided that both the old and
new officers and directors were liable under Article 99.
Article 99 is also criticized because it makes no allowance for the fact that
corporate managers are not able to make their decisions free of governmental
influence [27]. The government frequently intervenes through regulations and
other means. For example, the state may refuse to authorize a foreign invest-
ment in France; the state may choose not to permit the corporation to lay off a
large number of employees; the state may encourage the company to hire
unqualified personnel; the state may make unexpected tax levies; or the state
may simply fail to pay its bills on time.
I hope that I have demonstrated that there are persuasive arguments on
both sides of this issue. It is up to the legislature to decide whether Article 99
should be retained in its present form.
Professor Mercadal:
Mr. Denisot will now discuss the liability of officers and directors with
respect to mergers and acquisitions. He will give considerable attention to the
impact of the regulations in force in this area.
Mr. Denisot:
There are two approaches to the concept of responsibility. One approach
stresses management's ability to make a decision and the freedom of action
thereby presupposed. The other approach is more liability oriented; it em-
phasizes management's duty to report, in particular, to shareholders.
Twenty years ago management enjoyed almost unlimited freedom in the
area of merger and acquisitions. Their decisions were predicated on industrial,
commercial and financial strategies which they alone determined. Responsibil-
ity to make a sound decision was self-evident, but the duty to inform
shareholders was given little weight.
Regulations [28] enacted during the past fifteen to twenty years have greatly
affected both aspects of the concept of responsibility. The freedom of officers
and directors to make decisions has gradually been restricted, while their duty
to inform shareholders has been increasingly emphasized. These regulations
aim to strike a balance between these competing aspects of responsibility.
The change in France's tender offer regulations has been marked. In just a
few years the regulations have evolved from total freedom for officers and
directors to administrative control and need for authorization.
Until 1964, large blocks of stock could be sold in privately negotiated
transactions. Thus, it was possible to purchase a controlling interest in a
company without notifying anyone. Small shareholders often found themselves
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facing afait accompli. The first change was the 1964 Act [29] requirement that
all transactions in quoted shares be made on the exchanges. Although this
change was an improvement, it clearly was insufficient. In the absence of
precise provisions regulating takeovers by purchase, overbidding and intense
exchange battles often resulted.
Regulations dating back to 1966 give the Minister of Finance a veto power
over such transactions and call for the participation of the association of
broker/dealers and the Commission des Operations de Bourse (COB), in the
process. The stock brokers' association reviews the appropriateness of the
proposal under the control of the Minister of Finance, and ensures anonymity
and equal treatment. Generally speaking, the COB enforces fair play rules by
monitoring information disclosure, particularly in cases involving insider trad-
ing. For example, the prerogatives of the COB were given greater attention
after a famous exchange tender offer involving Boussois, Souchon, Neuvesel
and Saint-Gobain [30] in which there was inappropriate publicity.
In 1978, new statutes [31] were enacted which curtail manager and director
freedoms even further by: (1) establishing a commission that monitors tender
offers; and (2) enacting new regulations for competing bids and counter-offers,
insider trading, and certain target company management decisions made
during the offer period. These regulations are designed to protect shareholders
in the decision-making process by providing complete and objective informa-
tion concerning the purposes, terms, and consequences of the proposed trans-
action.
In the field of mergers, statutes [32] have long regulated the role of auditors
as well as the requirement that shareholders ratify the transaction. In the past,
these provisions had little impact because the auditors rarely challenged the
terms of transactions that had been carefully negotiated.
Like the tender offer regulations, the COB merger regulations require
managers and directors to provide complete information concerning the purpo-
ses, terms, and expected consequences of the transaction. In a 1972 regulation
[33] the COB extended its regulatory power to pricing and valuation of each
company's assets and liabilities. This regulation does not require the use of any
particular method but does prohibit the use of valuations that are nothing
more than ex post facto justifications. Valuations must be thoroughly sup-
ported by concrete, objective data whenever possible - such as profitability
studies and/or stock market prices. With this regulation, the COB entered an
area that had been solely in the domain of managers and directors.
Although the takeover regulations are pervasive in that they affect nearly all
phases of a transaction, the decision whether or not to proceed with a proposed
transaction still rests completely with management. The regulatory authorities
should not become involved with this decision. The essence of managerial
responsibility, the blending of intuition, business judgment, and conviction
when making decisions, will always remain within the province of manage-
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ment. However, once the transaction begins, the company representatives are
guided by the three stock exchange authorities mentioned above. Guidance,
however, does not include approving management decisions. The regulations
call upon the COB only to review the disclosure documents associated with the
transaction to ensure that they are complete and accurate. The COB's clearance
of the documents should not be interpreted as an approval of the merits of the
transaction itself.
It is difficult to determine the point at which regulations are so burdensome
that they become constraining. Although this increase in the regulatory power
of the stock exchange authorities has concerned some commentators, most
agree that the regulations are an improvement over the prior state of affairs.
The new regulations have generated several improvements in this area. First,
managers and directors are likely to make better decisions. They are acting on
better information which they gathered in order to satisfy their duties toward
shareholders. Moreover, the exposure of officers and directors to legal liability
may decrease because they will be able to better support their actions. Second,
this better information enables officers and directors to reduce the risk of
opposition to their proposals in the form of a negative shareholder vote or a
widespread acceptance of a counter tender offer. Third, comptrollers [34]
("commissaires" or auditors) now are more careful because they too may be
held liable. Managers and directors often amend their plans based upon
comptroller recommendations. Fourth, the COB's review of the documents
does lend some credibility to the proposed transaction, particularly in the event
of a subsequent suit against management. Since the introduction of takeover
regulations, shareholders have seldom attacked such transactions. The COB
probably discourages suits it considers unjustified.
In summary, the regulations currently in force governing mergers and
acquisitions strike a healthy balance between managerial freedom and investor
protection, the two approaches to managerial responsibility.
Dean Mundheim:
I would like to explore the practical implications of Article 99 by examining
how it influences business practice. The Chrysler Corporation's bout with
bankruptcy [35] provides an interesting setting. The Chrysler Corporation, a
U.S. corporation, had experienced large losses for several years. Chrysler's
ability to meet its current obligations was suspect and I believe that Chrysler's
debts may have exceeded the value of its assets on liquidation. Nevertheless,
Chrysler struggled to avoid bankruptcy, apparently because it believed that
bankruptcy would have a very detrimental impact on its ability to sell cars.
Consumers are likely to be hesitant to purchase automobiles produced by a
bankrupt corporation because they realize that such a corporation may be
unable to fulfill its warranty obligations. Although I believe Chrysler's direc-
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tors were concerned about the appropriate disclosure of Chrysler's financial
position, I do not think that they ever worried about personal liability. Had
they harbored such fears, I do not believe that they would have gone to such
lengths to avoid bankruptcy. I am interested in learning how French directors
of a hypothetical Chrysler-France would have acted in light of Article 99?
Professor Mercadal:
In France, over the last few years, some of the large steel companies have
found themselves in a situation similar to that of Chrysler. The deficits of these
companies continued to grow despite the fact that the officers and directors
had succeeded in obtaining government aid in the form of loans made on
favorable, and sometimes unique, terms. It was inconceivable that these
companies would close down because too many workers would have lost their
jobs. As it was, the large number of layoffs had created serious social protests.
In response to these developments the government bailed out the steel industry
by forgiving large debts.
No one would seriously advocate the application of Article 99 in such a
case, with respect to the company officers and directors, or the government
officials who authorized the debt forgiveness. No manager's wealth would have
been sufficient to pay off the company's debts. The government officials were
protected from liability because they acted in their official capacity as public
officers. In order to pursue the comparison I would like to ask: would Chrysler
U.S. have been permitted to close down had the management not been able to
improve its performance?
Dean Mundheim:
In hindsight, we know that there was a bailout, but in the late 1970s no one
at Chrysler could have been sure that it would be bailed out. Let me press the
question again. Mr. Berthon, if you had been counsel to Chrysler-France in my
example, how would you have advised the directors in light of Article 99 and
the potential liability which you described?
Mr. Berthon:
I agree with Professor Mercadal that France's steel industry provides an
appropriate comparison. Had I been counsel to the directors of Chrysler-France,
I would have informed the directors that they may be held liable for some or
all of the excess of liabilities over assets should they continue to operate the
business. But, I would have said no more. Counsel should not make, nor
attempt to make, the decision for the management of the company. As for my
personal view, I think, as I stated towards the end of my presentation, that it
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may be unfair to apply Article 99's presumption to courageous managers who
are trying their very best to reverse the bad fortunes of a company.
Mr. Denisot:
I question whether the steel industry in France provides a good example to
illustrate the unfairness of Article 99. It was a huge affair that was extremely
unusual in its dimensions and implications. The following common situation
demonstrates the potential unfairness of Article 99. In France, we presently
have large companies in financial difficulty that must lay off five to ten
thousand employees if they are to overcome their financial difficulties, but the
officers and directors of these companies know that it is unlikely that they will
be authorized to lay off so many workers. Some officers and directors find
themselves in still more difficult positions as a result of their memberships on
the boards of other companies. These directors realize that the image of each
company with which they are affiliated is likely to be tarnished by a decision
made by them to lay off a large number of employees because the government
will criticize them for causing high levels of unemployment. Nevertheless, the
management may be held liable under Article 99 for unduly delaying the filing
of a bankruptcy petition. The plight of these managers is unsolvable.
Professor Mercadal:
I would like to complete the answer to Professor Mundheim's question by
stating how Article 99 should generally be interpreted.
Article 99 must be evaluated with reference to the economic climate in
which it is applied. Article 99 was applied strictly while France's economic
climate was favorable, until roughly 1978. Managers of bankrupt companies
were presumed to be at fault and were often unable to overcome this presump-
tion. Such an appplication was appropriate because nearly all bankruptcies
were attributable to some form of mismanagement in a favorable economic
climate.
Under the present poor economic conditions, courts inquire carefully into
the behavior of the management. Courts review evidence such as the minutes
of the board of directors in order to determine whether the decision to remain
in business was the result of careful deliberation. Only those directors who
acted without a reasonable degree of care are now held liable under Article 99.
In a recent unpublished decision concerning a mid-sized company, the court of
appeals found the officers and directors not liable under Article 99 because the
court determined that they had acted reasonably. Under a standard of rea-
sonableness, the officers and directors could not have been expected to avoid
the company's failure. Professor Mundheim, would Chrysler have been per-
mitted to lay off one-third of its personnel in an effort to salvage the company?
This point is basic to the comparison.
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Dean Mundheim:
In the United States, a private company can lay off personnel without
governmental authorization. Indeed, the Chrysler Corporation laid off a sub-
stantial number of employees. The magnitude of these layoffs, as well as the
projected layoffs from a Chrysler bankruptcy, was a factor in the government's
ultimate decision to provide guarantees for loans made to Chrysler, because
President Carter was hesitant to alienate voters. It was not irrelevant to the
Administration's attitude toward the authorization of loan guarantees that the
heavy unemployment in Detroit, in Michigan generally, and among blacks in
particular, was potentially damaging to the President in the Michigan primary,
a primary which deeply interested the President. Nevertheless, this layoff-re-
lated consideration was not the only factor of consequence.
A decisive consideration was that if Chrysler went bankrupt, the United
States was likely to lose to foreign competition much of the then growing
market for front wheel drive, fuel efficient cars. Because automobile purchasers
tend to be repeat purchasers who develop an ongoing relationship with a single
manufacturer, it was feared that this loss of the initial customer base would be
permanent. Such a loss would have been all the more painful because Chrysler
was on the brink of competing effectively in this market. Of all the U.S.
manufacturers, Chrysler had made the most progress in the development of
front wheel drive, fuel efficient cars - with the development of its K car.
Another factor in the ultimate decision to grant loan guarantees was that,
were Chrysler to go out of business, the United States would be left with only
two major automobile companies. This posed antitrust concerns.
From the floor:
Earlier today, Professor Carvalhosa referred to the secondary liability of the
government in situations in which semi-public companies are concerned.
During the past few years there has been considerable discussion concerning
the government's status as a de facto director. I am interested in learning from
our American, Brazilian, and French colleagues whether there have been any
cases in which the government has been held liable in situations in which it was
influential in delaying the bankruptcy filing of a company. This is an im-
portant question, especially today when governmental intervention in such
areas is becoming more common.
Professor Mercadal:
Professor Carvalhosa, would you comment on the Brazilian experience?
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Professor Carvalhosa:
In nearly every country, perhaps with the exception of the United States,
the government is increasingly subsidizing business activity. As in Brazil,
governments often control the country's largest companies. This control may
take the form of active management of the company, which includes making
investment decisions and establishing policy orientations. Decisions are some-
times made which are not in the company's best interests, but which are in the
best interests of the country as a whole. In such situations it is appropriate for
the government, rather than the directors or officers, to pay the company's
debts because the government is managing the company.
Professor Mercadal:
In France, the government does not pay creditors of its own volition; it only
pays creditors after receiving a court order directing such action. In fact, some
observers believe that the government takes affirmative steps to avoid paying
creditors. In the course of its deliberations in one case, however, the govern-
ment did pay creditors. The court noted that the company involved, Papeterie
Chapelle-Darblay, would be unable to avoid bankruptcy. Upon the govern-
ment's application, the court agreed to permit the company to continue
operating in return for the government's written commitment to provide the
funds necessary to operate the business and repay new debts incurred. The
court's decision stated that the government had been a de facto director and
that this supported the court's requirement that the government pay the
creditors. I believe that this was clearly an error on the court's part. The court's
decision should have been based solely on the government's written commit-
ment to pay creditors.
The government was particularly interested. in seeing this company continue
in business. It feared that if the company closed down, the two to three
thousand employees laid off would hold the government responsible for the
loss of their jobs and vote against the government in the coming election.
Professor Houin:
There are presently two cases before European courts concerning govern-
mental liability. In the first case a public authority in a French possession
financed a company which is now bankrupt with a very large liability. It will
be interesting to see whether the public authority will be held liable.
In the second case, before the Belgian courts, a public authority was held
liable to a bankrupt corporation's creditors on the theory that the authority's
loans enabled the company to remain in business longer than it should have.
Some commentators believe there is a trend in favor of imposing liability on
public authorities which act like de facto directors.
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From the floor:
My question concerns the potential liability of managers of subsidiaries that
are wholly owned or controlled by other entities. The officers of such sub-
sidiaries are often required to adhere to the policies dictated by the parent
company or group. Are there any decisions concerning such situations in which
the officers of the subsidiary have been held personally liable in the event of
bankruptcy?
Professor Mercadal:
Officers and/or directors of subsidiaries could theoretically be held liable in
such circumstances. A court would apply the following test: Did the officers
and/or directors exercise due diligence? Did they take all reasonable precau-
tions to avoid bankruptcy?
Subsidiary officers and directors may raise the defense that they were
required to follow the parent company's or group's policies. This defence may
well be successful if these officers and directors can establish that the interests
of the parent company or group conflicted with their company's interests.
Subsidiary officers and directors can also take steps in advance of bankruptcy
which may relieve them of some or all liability. For example, a group of
subsidiary directors who also served as officers of the parent corporation
recently demanded and received from the chairman of the parent company a
guarantee that he would assume a portion of any liability incurred by them as
a result of pursuing the parent company's interests. The courts have yet to pass
on such arrangements, but I do not believe that they will necessarily oppose
them.
I would like to thank Professor Mundheim for stimulating this fruitful
discussion. We have examined the ways in which our various countries react to
actual and potential bankruptcies of corporations that have significant eco-
nomic power. Once again we were reminded that these issues often have
political ramifications that influence governmental responses.
I think we all agree that Article 99 is controversial, and that this is due in
large measure to the presumption that those in authority are at fault. The most
common, although not the only, fault hypothesis is that those in authority
unjustifiably allowed a company to continue its operations. Professor Houin,
as the leading French bankruptcy expert, do you think Article 99 should be
retained in its present form?
Professor Houin:
I will answer this question by evaluating several of the significant features of
Article 99. I believe Article 99 should be retained but, as I will explain, some
features should be reconsidered.
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We must remember that Article 99 was enacted in response to the tremendous
difficulty that bankruptcy trustees experienced in attempting to prove mis-
management. Many clever officers and directors made it very difficult for
bankruptcy trustees to discover management errors and to gather the evidence
needed to establish fault. After several episodes in which it was clearly
impossible for the trustee to prove mismanagement, the legislature introduced
a fault presumption. At first the presumption applied only with respect to
soci6t~s anonymes (corporations), but it was then extended to soci~t~s
responsabilit6 limit~e [36], and ultimately it was extended to all companies.
One of the weaknesses of Article 99 is the near total discretion it vests in
judges in determining the liability of individual officers and directors. Al-
though this discretion was intended to serve the laudable purpose of propor-
tioning liability based on relative fault, it was at times based upon ability to
pay or other factors, rather than upon relative fault. The scarecrow of Article
99, which is often used, and which nearly amounts to blackmail, is threatening
to force harsh terms upon management in the reorganization in return, for
example, for creditor votes favoring reorganization as opposed to liquidation.
Another problem with Article 99 is that it may be too severe. Many
managers and directors fear Article 99. This fear sometimes generates unde-
sirable behavior; for example, some managers of companies headed toward
bankruptcy have reasoned that since they are likely to be found liable under
Article 99, they may as well keep the company in business for as long as
possible because this allows them to continue to collect their salaries. A law
that encourages such behavior is clearly counterproductive.
On balance, I believe that Article 99 should be retained. It is not without its
problems, but it is an improvement over the pre-Article 99 laws. However, I
believe that it should only be applied to bankruptcy cases that result in
liquidation. This would serve to encourage officers and directors to file early,
which would in turn increase the likeliho6d of a successful reorganization.
Similar reasoning explains why Article 99 does not apply to agreements
between or among creditors not to sue a company in financial difficulty in
order to give the company time to recover.
Dean Mundheim:
Professor Houin, are managers and directors who exercise business judg-
ment in good faith liable under Article 99 if their judgment results in
bankruptcy?
Professor Houin:
This type of question arises in both the corporate and noncorporate law
areas. It is one of the most difficult questions in our entire civil code. In the
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situation you pose, Professor Mundheim, French law would ask the following
vague yet convenient question: What would a reasonably competent officer or
director have done in the same circumstances? It is extremely difficult for a
judge to answer this question without being influenced by his knowledge of the
events that have already taken place. Of course, this difficulty is always
encountered when one engages in ex post facto reasoning. Application of this
test explains why old, senile directors are often held liable for only a small
percentage of the total liability.
From the floor:
I would like to briefly address a point raised by Professor Houin - the
severity of Article 99. I am involved with the negotiations of the EEC
Bankruptcy Convention. The severity of Article 99 has received a great deal of
attention in the negotiations. The convention's desire to maintain a concept of
unity - uniform application of the law of the State in which the bankruptcy
has been opened to all officers and directors no matter what their citizenship -
has been abandoned on this point because other countries feel that Article 99
is too harsh to be applied to their citizens.
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